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Cities as catalysts of social change? 




Across the world, people in urban rather than rural areas are more likely to support gender 
equality. To explain this global trend, this paper engages with geographically diverse literature 
and comparative rural-urban ethnographic research from Zambia. It argues that people living 
in interconnected, heterogeneous, densely populated areas are more likely to see women 
performing socially valued, masculine roles. Such exposure incrementally erodes gender 
ideologies, catalysing a positive feedback loop, and increasing flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour. Women in densely populated areas also tend to have greater access to health clinics 
and police, so are more able to control their fertility and secure external support against 
gender-based violence. However, the urban is not inevitably disruptive. Experiences of the 
urban are shaped by international and national policies, macro-economic conditions, and 
individual circumstances. Through this comparative ethnography, this paper contributes to 











Globally, there appears to be greater (and more rapidly growing) support for gender equality 
in urban rather than rural areas. Urban residents are typically more supportive of girls’ 
education, women’s employment, and female political leadership. Why is this? And what does 
it tell us about the causes of egalitarian social change?  
The aim of this paper is to explore and explain rural-urban differences in gender ideologies. 
Since this is a global phenomenon, the literature review draws on a geographically diverse 
range of studies. By adopting this international outlook, this paper contributes to a growing 
body of work that seeks to understand the urban (its core characteristics and implications) by 
examining its manifestations in different contexts (Jarvis et al. 2009; Robinson 2011). This 
epistemology also helps shed light on further socio-economic and political factors of 
significance, besides the urban.  
After reviewing the literature on existing findings and explanations of rural-urban differences, 
the paper presents ethnographic research from rural and urban Zambia. My evidence indicates 
two key features of cities: (1) greater exposure to women undertaking socially valued, 
masculine roles (which undermines gender ideologies); and (2) greater access to health clinics 
and police (which increases women’s ability to control their fertility and secure external 
support against gender-based violence). These are not inevitable characteristics of cities, nor 
are they impossible in rural contexts, but they are more common in cities.  
This comparative research contributes to urban geographies by highlighting the effects of 
interconnectedness, heterogeneity, and population density. These key characteristics of cities1 
appear to disrupt gender inequalities. Had I focused on the urban alone, I would have 
blinkered myself to its distinctive attributes and advantages. For example, feminist 
geographies of the urban tend to see persistent gender divisions of labour and inequalities, 
 
1 Theorists disagree over (i) how we should conceptualise ‛the urban’; (ii) whether economic agglomeration 
is inevitable; and, given the diverse histories, economies, spatialities and imaginaries of cities across the 
Global North and South, (iii) whether we should even posit a singular definition of ‘the urban’. Scott and 
Storper (2014) suggest that cities are all driven by and produce economies of agglomeration. Others differ 
(Amin and Thrift, 2002; Brenner and Schmid, 2015; Lall et al, 2017; Parnell and Pieters, 2016). But all still 
recognise that cities bring together, juxtapose and (through mutual learning, new alliances as well as 
contestation) enable the recalibration of intersecting regional and transnational flows of ideas, information, 
histories, ambitions, performances, media, labour, commodities, capital, and competing authorities. 
Interconnectedness, heterogeneity, and population density appear to be common denominators, with broad 
agreement (Amin 2007; Brenner and Schmid 2015: 177; Simone 2013; Scott and Storper 2014).  
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emphasizing minimal benefits for low-income women compared with their wealthier 
counterparts (e.g. Chant 2013; Chant and McIlwaine 2016; Hansen, 1997). Some theorists 
doubt everyday urban encounters with difference might reduce prejudice (Amin 2002; 
Valentine et al. 2014). These pessimistic portrayals draw on research in towns and cities. But 
I suggest that we may enhance our understanding of the urban by taking a step back, 
traversing the rural-urban spectrum, and investigating differences in more sparsely populated, 
remote, and agrarian localities.  
 
This paper also fine-tunes our theorisation of gender norms. Some theorists understand norms 
as iterative, embodied, social performances (Butler 2004:48-51). Others emphasise ‘collective 
definitions of socially approved conduct’: not individual consciousness, but ‘properties of a 
community’ (Pearse and Connell, 2016: 31-34, 46). But how exactly do these social practices 
and discourses influence individual behaviour? To understand why gender norms change or 
persist, we need to focus on people’s reasons for acting (their beliefs and desires), not just 
their behavioural expressions, or social aggregates.  
 
Here it is helpful to distinguish between two kinds of gender beliefs: an individual’s internalised 
stereotypes (assumptions about a person because of their gender) and their norm perceptions 
(beliefs about what others think and do). This distinction accommodates the possibility that 
someone is privately critical of gender stereotypes, yet complies due to concerns about how 
they will be perceived and treated by others. Internalised stereotypes and norm perceptions 
are both developed through observation and personal experience. By interacting with others, 
people learn which behaviours are widely practiced and supported in their communities. The 
belief that peers will chastise deviation furnishes individuals with a self-interested reason to 
conform.2  
 
The concept of ‘norm perceptions’ explains the path dependent nature of gender relations, as 
it articulates the causal relationship between wider practices, individual psychologies and 
behaviour. Together with internalised stereotypes, such perceptions may inhibit social change. 
By contrast, conceptualisations of ‘norms’ as aggregate features of a given society struggle to 
elucidate their causal connection to individual behaviour.  
 
 
2 This emphasis on other people’s expectations and concerns for social respect echoes earlier ethnographies 
of Zambia (Crehan, 1997). 
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The overarching argument of this paper is that norm perceptions are more likely to be 
disrupted in diverse, interconnected and densely populated places, i.e. cities. By presenting a 
positive narrative from Zambia, this paper nuances pessimistic portrayals of African cities: as 
‘crowded, disconnected, costly and closed for business; marked by entrenched gender 
inequalities (Lall et al, 2017; Chant and McIlwaine, 2016; Davies, 2006; Hansen, 1997). 
 
2 Literature review 
2.1 A brief survey of existing findings on rural-urban differences  
A growing body of literature suggests that increasing support for gender equality is largely 
concentrated in urban areas. Mixed methods research in 20 middle- and low-income countries 
suggests that young urban women are ‘beginning to envision a future similar to young men: 
education, independence, greater financial autonomy, and shared responsibility for their 
family’ (Boudet et al. 2012: 97). Urban focus groups are more likely to endorse female labour 
force participation and describe ‘good husbands’ as those that take on unpaid care work 
(Boudet et al. 2012: 38, 41). Youth in Gabarone (Botswana) likewise gave dichotomous 
portrayals of urban men sharing care work (partnering with employed, strong, assertive, urban 
women) and rural patriarchs (leading submissive, passive, rural women). They further 
presented urban gender ideologies as dynamic and changeable, but the rural as static 
(Giddings and Hovorka 2010). Little’s (2002: 87) overview of rural life in the Global North 
similarly underscores ‘the strength of traditional ideas concerning gender roles… and the lack 
of (overt) contestation of these roles’. These rural-urban differences in gender ideologies seem 
to hold even when we control for individual-level characteristics such as age, education, 
occupation, marital status, wealth, and media access (Alesina et al. 2016; Snow et al, 2013; 
Uthman et al. 2009). Place matters, seemingly more so than education or wealth. 
However, these trends do not hold universally: self-described rural (as opposed to urban) 
residence is strongly associated with conservative gender ideologies in western but not 
eastern Germany (Dirksmeier 2015). Rural-urban differences in gender ideologies may also 
change over time. In the USA—when we control for age, race, education, marital status, and 
income—urban residents are more likely to express support for women’s leadership and 
employment. But these rural-urban differences reduced between 1974 and 1998, as rural 
residents increasingly endorsed gender equality (Carter and Borch 2005). 
 
4 
There are also rural-urban differences in practices. For all 83 countries with available 
Democratic and Health Surveys data, fertility is consistently lower in urban areas (although it 
remains high in the poorest slums (Martine et al. 2013)). At an aggregate level, urban girls 
are more likely to marry and become pregnant later. They tend to have better access to sexual 
and reproductive health services (although this clearly varies with individual-level 
characteristics such as wealth (Chant and McIlwaine 2016: 56; Klugman et al. 2014: 110; 
UNFPA 2007: 28)). The prevalence of (and support for) female genital cutting is also lower 
(and falling more rapidly) in urban areas (UNICEF 2013). Gender inequalities in education also 
seem to be closing more quickly in urban areas. In China over the past three decades, the 
gender gap in education has dramatically reduced in urban but not in rural areas (Zeng et al. 
2014). In urban sub-Saharan Africa, gender disparities in primary and secondary education 
have almost entirely closed. Meanwhile, rural gender inequalities persist. 
Some evidence suggests that urban marriages are more egalitarian. In Bangladesh and 
Zambia, there are statistically significant associations between urban residence and a 
woman’s participation in household decision-making (Boateng et al. 2014; Head et al. 2015). 
Further rural-urban differences are illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3. 
Figure 1: Women’s acceptance of wife beating wanes along the rural-urban 
spectrum in Zambia and sub-Saharan Africa 
 




Figure 2: Rural men and women are more likely to express a preference for male 
leaders in Zambia and sub-Saharan Africa
 
Source: Author and Swiss 2016. 






Source: Kolev and Sirven (2012: 46–7). 
But urban practices are not always more egalitarian. Although people in urban areas of sub-
Saharan Africa are less likely to justify gender-based violence, they are more likely to report 
it (Alesina et al. 2016). Urban rates of gender-based violence seem especially high for young, 
poor, and/or gay women (ibid; Chant and McIlwaine 2016: 137–48). Another example of 
urban gender inequality is that in urban India, where there is greater access to reproductive 
technology and sex-selective abortions, parents are more able to realize their pre-existing 
preference for a son (Subramanian and Corsi 2011). Between 1985 and 1995, urbanization 
was similarly associated with more sex-selective abortions in South Korea. However, over the 
long term, sex ratios have become more equitable in South Korea, with dwindling son 
preference in urban areas (Chung and Das Gupta 2007). What drives such change and 
continuity in gender ideologies and practices? 
 
2.2 Four hypotheses about rural-urban differences 
This section considers four different hypotheses about rural-urban differences in gender 
ideologies and practices. These include spatial variation in (1) economic opportunities, (2) 
access to services, (3) anonymity, and (4) propinquity and heterogeneity. Clearly there are no 
monocausal explanations. My interest concerns their relative importance.  
One possible cause of rural-urban differences in gender ideologies is that there are better 
economic opportunities for women in urban areas. These may motivate urban families to 
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invest in girls’ education, increase women’s social respect, and improve women’s ability to 
survive independently outside marriage (as argued by Boudet et al. 2012: 55, 90; Bradshaw 
1995, 2013: 84; Chant and McIlwaine 2016; Giddings and Hovorka 2010; McIlwaine 2013: 
77). Meanwhile, rural women’s economic dependence on their husbands may incentivise 
compliance with patriarchal practices (as Mwansa, 2013 suggests of Eastern Zambia). 
However, economic opportunities might not be the underlying cause of rural-urban 
differences. For itt begs a further question: why are there more economic opportunities for 
women in urban areas? In Zambia, for instance, 45% of rural women in the labour force are 
unpaid family workers, against 16% of rural men, 6% of urban women, and 2% of urban men 
(CSO 2011: 118). Why are women so much less likely to be paid for their work if they live in 
rural areas? Moreover, economic returns do not always appear sufficient to reduce rural 
gender bias in education (as Field and Ambrus 2008 and Maertens 2013 find in Bangladesh 
and India). Third, employment does not necessarily enhance a rural woman’s status. In Egypt, 
paid work does not increase the likelihood that rural women will express gender egalitarian 
beliefs or participate in decision-making (Salem et al. 2015). Additionally, across 20 countries, 
‘urban men were generally more likely than rural men to voice appreciation for wives who 
earn income… Often their quite active economic participation may go unrecognized or even 
be hidden because of the status their communities attach to being “just a housewife”’ (Boudet 
et al. 2012: 38; see also Crehan, 1997 on male authority persisting notwithstanding men and 
women’s economic interdependence). It may be that women’s income generation is less 
widely accepted in rural areas and less likely to catalyse ideological change due to some 
characteristic of rural environments. This warrants further investigation. 
A second possibility is that rural gender inequalities are reinforced by poor access to services. 
In rural England, women’s employment is constrained by inadequate public transport and 
childcare (Hughes 1997). Living further away from the police, rural women might also be less 
able to secure external intervention against gender-based violence (as suggested by 
McIlwaine 2013). Additionally, remoteness from health services might decrease the likelihood 
of contraceptive use—increasing girls’ school dropouts, curbing their human capital, and 
dampening employment prospects. Greater distances to water and electricity create higher 
domestic workloads for women in rural (than urban) areas (as found in Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, and South Africa (Blackden and Wodon 2006; Laderchi et al. 
2010: 239; Robles 2010: 309)). This limits their available time for leisure, employment and 
political participation (as Chimba, 2005:67; Liatto-Katundo, 1993 suggest of Zambia). 
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But spatial variation in access to infrastructure and services does not appear to provide a full 
explanation. Also significant are different gender ideologies: urban men typically perform a 
greater share of care work (Levtov et al 2015). Likewise, there seem to be rural-urban 
differences in demand for services. In Ethiopia, Honduras, and Kenya, men (who tend to be 
pronatalist) exercise greater influence over reproductive decision-making in rural areas. 
Accordingly, ‘improvements in service and infrastructure in rural areas, although necessary, 
may not be sufficient to enable rural women to implement their preferences as fully as urban 
women and thereby close the rural-urban gap in fertility and contraceptive use’ (Dodoo and 
Tempenis 2002: 67). Further, although urban residents tend to have better access to 
infrastructure, this may not hold for slum dwellers (Chant and McIlwaine 2016: 93). 
A third hypothesis is that urban areas enable anonymity, and thereby weaken social control 
(as argued by Wirth 1938). The multiple, non-overlapping social networks created by urban 
population density impede the circulation of information (‘gossip’), allowing people to keep 
different domains separate. Urban anonymity arguably fosters female autonomy. ‘[In town] a 
woman is independent. You are free to do as you please. There are no homestead people 
watching you,’ explained a Xhosa South African participant (Mayer 1961: 249–25). By 
contrast, in small, tightly knit rural communities, deviation from gender norms is more visible 
and more closely monitored. To quote one rural Norwegian adolescent, ‘in the rural parish 
everybody knows what you do… all the old ladies are sitting ready with their binoculars and 
telephone… [They would] probably impress any Al-Qaeda member. Because it is in the rural 
parishes the old ladies with the inclination to spread gossip are those who in one way or 
another “know your mother”’ (Haughen and Villa 2006: 187). In rural areas, where more 
people know what you think and do, it may be more difficult to evade social sanction. For 
example, in south-western Kenya, ‘girls noted that the close knit nature of the community 
made it difficult to get [contraceptives] privately’ (Milligan 2014: 469). By contrast, middle-
class families in urban Zambia, with perimeter walls ensuring privacy, might be able to 
redistribute unpaid care work without anyone else knowing or judging (Author 2016). 
However, greater anonymity in urban areas would only explain why urban residents are more 
able to behaviourally deviate from widely shared gender ideologies, not why those ideologies 
are different in urban areas. For instance, anonymity could explain rural-urban differences in 
the prevalence of female genital cutting, but perhaps not rural-urban differences in (privately 
expressed) support for this practice (as recorded by UNICEF 2013).  
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Moreover, even if urban residents are under less surveillance from their kin, they may still 
care about how they will be perceived and treated by strangers—as illustrated by much 
feminist urban geography. In Delhi: 
Women are under constant scrutiny: for what they wear, how they behave, 
where they are going, who they are with, at what time of day or night. They 
are under pressure to conform to familiar boundaries of tradition and class. 
Challenging these boundaries carries the risk of psycho-social dissonance and 
assault of various kinds. (Butcher 2015; see also Thomas 2005 on South 
Carolina.)  
Urban men likewise perform gender, equally aware of public appraisals of their conduct and 
concerned about social respect—in schools, at work, and on the street (as Ferguson 1999: 
114 observed in Zambia).  
The central limitation of the preceding hypotheses is the need to further explain rural-urban 
differences in gender ideologies. Much feminist geography suggests this is a key factor (on 
Britain, Nicaragua, and more globally, see Bradshaw 1995, 2013: 84; Jarvis et al. 2009: 113; 
Little 2002: 87; McIlwaine 2013: 77). So why might gender ideologies differ between rural 
and urban contexts? Perhaps there is something particularly disruptive about cities? Tonkiss 
(2005: 95) writes of early 20th-century London: ‘if the pace, diversity and instability of urban 
life disturbed established social forms, this included gender roles and codes of conduct.’ 
Exposure to heterogeneity (my fourth hypothesis) has been central to classic and 
contemporary characterizations of the urban: ‘as both Georg Simmel and Henri Lefebvre 
paradigmatically recognized in different moments of 20th-century capitalist development, this 
transformative potential inheres in the social, economic and cultural differentiations that are 
produced through urbanization, which connect diverse populations, institutions, activities, 
interactions and experiments in specific sociospatial configurations’ (Brenner and Schmid 
2015: 177; see also Amin 2007; Simone 2013; Scott and Storper 2014). 
But why might heterogeneity catalyse social change? Perhaps living in a large community 
increases tolerance of diversity, of others doing things with which one personally disagrees 
(as found by Dulani et al. 2016 and Huggins and Debies-Carl 2015). But while tolerance might 
explain reduced social condemnation and neighbourly interference (e.g. not chastizing 
outspoken women), does it really capture positive support for gender equality (voting for 
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women, educating one’s daughter)? An alternative possibility, suggested by Jarvis et al. (2009: 
113), is that urban heterogeneity disrupts gender ideologies: 
Globalising and world cities… experience… increased exposure to different 
cultural and social norms, because of their very openness, and therefore have 
the capacity to induce gender liquefaction—melting, blending and re-solidifying 
new gendered norms... A global or world city, therefore, has to have the 
capacity to create and maintain different gendered forms that can only thrive 
in this rich, diversified urban environment, else it may become the stage for a 
conservative backlash.  
This raises an interesting question: why does exposure to alternatives sometimes (but not 
always) trigger backlash? Urban heterogeneity clearly does not render gender equality 
inevitable. For centuries, London women have predominated in low-status, low-paid jobs. 
Prejudices (of all kinds) persist, notwithstanding diversity (Amin 2002; Valentine et al. 2014).  
Further, what kinds of exposure are catalytic? Exposure to abstract ideas of equality (gender 
sensitization, facilitated by urban-based NGOs); media exposure to Western ideas (as 
suggested in Giddings and Hovorka 2010); or physically encountering alternative possibilities? 
UNICEF (2013: 36–7) suggests that because urban areas are more ‘culturally diverse’ there is 
a greater likelihood of mixing with groups that do not practise female genital cutting. Through 
exposure to and association in urban environments, where uncircumcized girls do not suffer 
a loss in social respect, people may come to question their internalized ideologies and also 
their norm perceptions (beliefs about what others think and do). But is such heterogeneity an 
inevitable feature of the urban? Informed by this literature, the remainder of this article 
explores the extent of rural-urban differences in Zambian gender ideologies and practices, as 
well as their possible causes.  
3 Methodology 
This study primarily draws on ethnographic research. Through life history interviews and group 
discussions, participants were invited to share their perceptions and explanations of rural-
urban differences. Participants included 21 men and 37 women: 43 from rural areas (34 of 
whom were circular migrants) and 15 urban residents. The study was initially based in the 
largest city in the Zambian Copperbelt: Kitwe (with a population of 506,045). I had previously 
undertaken a year’s ethnographic research here, exploring processes of social change. 
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Previous informants from the central market introduced me to rural-urban circular migrants—
most of whom were fish wholesalers from the same village, Chinsanka. This was a remote 
location: over 10 hours’ drive north (along deeply potholed, waterlogged, untarmacked roads) 
in Luapula Province. This small fishing village of 1,298 residents, perched on the sandy (largely 




Image 1: Looking onto the still waters of Lake Bangweulu 
 
Source: author’s photograph. 
Although respondents largely comprised low-income market traders, fishermen, and 
homemakers, this paper is also informed by my previous research with a greater socio-
economic range of urban participants: domestic workers, unemployed men, teachers, wealthy 
business people, and parliamentarians (Author 2014, 2015a). I use this earlier data to explain 
how people’s experiences of the city are shaped by their socio-economic circumstances.  
Having developed rapport, I invited participants to narrate their life histories; reflect on their 
experiences of different spaces; describe gender ideologies and practices in those spaces; and 
identify salient influences. They subsequently shared and debated differing perspectives in 
group discussions. We spoke in village and town Bemba (two slightly different vocabularies, 
in which I am fluent).  
Despite such efforts, I was nonetheless conscious of the limitations of interviews, which only 
provide insights into how a person seeks to present themselves and their communities at that 
particular moment. Participants may have caricatured the urban/rural, obscuring diversity or 
confounding normative and descriptive truths. Some participants spoke for others, blaming 
rural girls for their lack of concentration in school. Such narratives are still illuminating, 
however, as they reveal people’s expectations of rural girls. Another concern was that 
participants’ constructions of the past might have been biased by memory loss and current 
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beliefs. Accordingly, I drew on historical ethnographies, and further triangulated discourses 
by speaking to other family members. But I may have misread their portrayals. In discussions 
about gender equality, participants might have endorsed widely circulating normative claims, 
to which they might not have conformed in practice. To minimize peer influence, I also 
facilitated individual interviews. But their narratives may have been affected by my identity: a 
white European, possibly presumed to endorse gender equality. However, feigned agreement 
is not consistent with my observations of our interactions. Participants seemed to particularly 
enjoy relating their stories about their communities. They also (often repeatedly) encouraged 
me to share their priorities, such as marriage, childbearing, and wearing African attire. I 
adopted the latter—much to my hosts’ delight. 
Narratives were triangulated through observation. Besides studying gendered interactions in 
public places (leisure, trade, mourning, and politics), I also lived with participants. Since I did 
not observe all participants’ lives, I retain scepticism about claims made. They may only reflect 
aspirations or beliefs, rather than practices.  
Data was recorded, transcribed into English, and then transferred into software enabling 
qualitative text analysis (NVivo 10). The data was then coded, using emergent themes and 
subthemes. Names have been changed to preserve anonymity. 
4 Local context: Kitwe and Chinsanka 
The British colonial government and mining companies curbed women’s participation in the 
largest economic sectors: mining, domestic service, and rural-urban trade. Emergent norm 
perceptions of male breadwinners endured for as long as they were enabled by macro-
economic conditions. During the early decades of independence, high international copper 
prices, limited mechanization, state-directed industrialization, and investment in social services 
meant that men could largely provide for their families single-handedly.3 Resulting gender 
divisions of labour prevented popular exposure to women demonstrating their equal 
competence in socially valued domains. Older urban participants narrated that women from 
across the socio-economic spectrum typically underestimated their own abilities. Those who 
deviated from widely shared gender ideologies (outspoken women, for instance) were typically 
reprimanded. Outliers seldom undermined people’s assumptions about women in general, and 
 
3 The 1969 census presents Kitwe’s working African population as comprising 36,017 men and 3,283 
women (CSO 1973: 8). 
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hence did not create a positive feedback loop (Author 2015b; Chimba, 2005; Epstein 1992; 
Hansen, 1997; Ferguson 1999; Powdermaker 1962). Women’s median age at first marriage 
was similar in rural and urban areas in 1992: 17.2 and 17.5 (CSO et al. 1997: 4). 
This historical analysis suggests that the urban is not inevitably disruptive. It also undermines 
some hypotheses about rural-urban differences. Even if there are economic opportunities in 
urban areas, they may be extremely male-dominated (even in services – domestic work, 
teaching, and clerical jobs - Hansen, 1997). Further, increased anonymity through population 
density does not appear to enhance women’s status or autonomy—at least not in this context 
of economic dependence on male breadwinners and widely shared gender ideologies. Nor 
does proximity to services entail women’s bodily autonomy. In previous decades, clinics might 
request a husband’s letter of permission before issuing contraceptives (ZARD 1996: 42). 
Significant rupture has recently occurred in urban areas. Worsening economic security (from 
the early 1980s, with trade liberalization, privatization, public sector contraction, resultant job 
losses, the introduction of user fees, and HIV/AIDS) led households to perceive female labour 
force participation as advantageous (as also observed by Barankariza, 2016; Chileshe, 2014; 
Hansen, 1997; Mususa, 2010). The resulting critical mass of women in paid work is 
increasingly interpreted as signalling that other people now regard women as suited to socially 
valued roles—thereby shifting norm perceptions. Seeing women demonstrating their equal 
abilities in historically male-dominated domains also appears to have undermined gender 
stereotypes relating to competence and status. Shifts in perceived interests have thus 
catalysed behavioural change, amplified exposure, and fostered a positive feedback loop. 
‘Abanakashi kuti babomba incito sha baume’ (women can do what men can do) has become 
a popular urban expression of gender equality. ‘Ifitenge kuntanshi, amatoloshi kunuma’ (skirts 
to the front, trousers to the back) is another slogan, favoured by low-income, urban political 
activists. It means women should lead. ‘Tuli cimo cine fye’ (we are one and the same) is a 
third—voiced by women and men alike (Author 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Mususa, 2010).4 
Image 2: ‘Women can do what men can do’: two co-workers in Kitwe 
 
4 This is not to imply that gender ideologies have been eradicated in Kitwe; only to highlight social change. 




Source: author’s photograph. 
Gender ideologies in rural areas seem more resistant to change, however. Rural gender 
inequalities were historically reinforced by men’s privileged access to income-generating 
opportunities in urban areas; Christianity; male bias in government interventions; and 
declining soil fertility, which undermined the socio-economic value of women’s agricultural 
work (Gordon 2006; Harrison 1995; Moore and Vaughan 1994; Poewe 1981). Men were 
revered as breadwinners. They were also regarded as more competent in socially valued 
domains. Incito sha banakashi (women’s work, both agricultural and domestic) was widely 
devalued, and commonly referred to as ukwikala (just sitting).  
Rural gender practices seem to persist, despite urban disruption. Over the 1990s and 2000s, 
rural-urban differences widened for women’s median age at first marriage, contraceptive use, 
fertility rates, and teenage pregnancy. Between 1992 and 2013/14, the fertility rate fell 
drastically in urban areas (from 5.8 to 3.7) but barely changed in rural areas (from 7.1 to 6.6) 
(CSO et al. 1993: 28, 2015: 85). Teenage pregnancy declined by almost a third in urban areas 
(from 29% to 20%), but only marginally in rural areas (from 40% to 36%) (CSO et al. 1993: 
35, 2015: 77). The proportion of child marriages in rural areas is almost double that of urban 
areas (39% versus 18%: Malé and Wodon, 2016). Young women in rural (rather than urban) 
areas are also more likely to report experience of emotional and sexual (though not physical) 
violence (Kusathan et al, 2015). 
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Even when there are professional opportunities in rural areas, they are male-dominated. 
Although women account for a larger proportion of the labour force in rural areas (49%, 
compared with 37% in urban areas), they are much more under-represented in professional 
(i.e. high-status) employment in rural areas (36%, contrasted with 44% in urban areas) (CSO 
2012: 227–8). This seems to count against the hypothesis that rural-urban differences stem 
from better economic opportunities for women (and the lesser importance of physical 
strength) in urban areas. 
Rural-urban differences are also manifest in gender ideologies. People living in a large city are 
statistically less likely to justify wife beating than their countryside compatriots when 
educational level, work status, and wealth quintile are controlled for (Author and Swiss 2016; 
see also Figure 1). These beliefs also seem to be changing more rapidly in urban areas (Figure 
4). Clearly, apparent urban change might only reflect more feigned egalitarianism in the wake 
of urban-centred NGO campaigns. But this would still be an important form of social change: 




Figure 4: Percentage of respondents who agreed with at least one justification 
for wife beating 
 
Source: CSO et al. 2009: 264–5, 2015: 265. 
In 2010/12, 19% of urban and 32% of rural respondents endorsed the claim that ‘men make 
better political leaders than women’ (Afrobarometer 2016). This is consistent with my 
observations: there was more overt resistance to (and condemnation of) women’s leadership 
in rural areas. While public discussions were always male-dominated, women seemed more 
vocal in Kitwe than in Chinsanka. These trends persisted even when gender-balanced 
composition had been mandated, such as in Chinsanka’s Area Development Committee. Some 
rural participants even denied the possibility of women leaders—in government, religion, 
traditional authority structures, or agricultural cooperatives.  
Rural women in my sample primarily identified as wives and mothers, often doubting whether 
they could survive independently outside marriage (as also observed by Mwansa, 2013). While 
young urban women are also eager to marry, it is rarely their highest priority. Employment 
comes first. Further, their entrepreneurial success is likely to be lauded by urban men. 
Although gender inequalities persist in Kitwe, they are more frequently punctured by diverse, 
disruptive discourses (compared with Chinsanka). Moreover, there is greater public awareness 
of such contestation. By contrast, even if rural participants privately disavowed norm 
perceptions, they typically perceived themselves as powerless to change the status quo. 
But rural-urban differences are not always apparent. Exceptions include proclivity to justify a 














making regarding their own healthcare and large purchases (CSO 2015: 267; Author and Swiss 
2016). Further, in both rural and urban areas, men’s share of care work remains minimal 
(Author 2016). Curiously, these domains of rural-urban commonality all concern domestic 
spaces. Rural-urban differences seem much greater in the public domains of education, 
employment, and leadership. Why might this be?  
Rural-urban differences appear to be especially large in Zambia. This might be due to counter-
urbanization in the 1980s and 1990s (Potts, 2016). Given low historical rural-urban migration, 
most urban Copperbelt residents were born in the urban Copperbelt, not in rural areas. 
Further, because support for gender equality really only increased in the 2000s, urban-rural 
migration in the 1980s–1990s would not have exported gender equality to rural areas. 
Countries with higher historical and contemporary rates of intranational migration would likely 
have smaller rural-urban differences in gender ideologies. 
5 Explanations of urban change and rural continuity in gender ideologies and 
practices 
Rural-urban migrants, as well as long-term rural and urban residents, emphasized two key 
features of Zambian towns and cities: more women undertaking socially valued roles, and 
greater access to services. They further narrated how these both unsettle gender ideologies 
and practices. Exposure to women demonstrating their equal abilities in socially valued roles 
appears to undermine gender ideologies relating to competence and status. This seems to 
foster a positive feedback loop, with growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. 
Meanwhile, greater proximity to services in urban areas makes it easier for women to control 
their fertility and secure external intervention against gender-based violence. 
I will argue that these two phenomena (exposure and services) are more likely in more 
interconnected, heterogeneous, densely populated areas. Through multiple sightings of others 
doing things differently, people come to question their prior assumptions, revise their norm 
perceptions, and become more inclined to adopt alternative practices—thereby fostering a 
positive feedback loop. Services are also typically more proximate in densely populated areas. 





5.1 Exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
Rural isolation seems to reinforce continuity in gender beliefs and relations. In Chinsanka, 
men are widely perceived and revered as providers. As Sarah (a 30-year-old rural homemaker 
and mother of four, who—unlike her brothers—had not completed school) explained: 
It’s men who provide for us, who buy us everything. Husbands help parents 
[financially] but we women don’t do it much. We don’t really concentrate on 
school… We get pregnant. You’re finished now, it’s over… A boy will make her 
pregnant and he will return to school; whereas the girls’ parents will refuse to 
educate her again. They’ll say ‘you will get pregnant again,’ thinking it’s a waste 
of money. (Translated.) 
Indeed, when interviewed separately, her mother, Mary (55), maintained:  
Rural girls—paying for their education is a waste of money. They’re just 
interested in men. (Translated.)  
These gender ideologies persisted even when I was accompanied by Grace, my rural host, 
who had recently returned from selling fish in Kitwe. Such outliers did not appear to diminish 
stereotypes about rural women. Perhaps this was partly due to their limited visibility: besides 
being few in number, they also performed their economic roles outside the village, out of 
sight. With limited exposure to alternative discourses and practices, women tend to adopt 
widely shared ideologies, lack confidence in the possibility of social change, and thus limit 
their aspirations to marriage and motherhood (see also Mwansa, 2013). 
This explanation of rural-urban differences was shared by rural-urban circular migrants, who 
drew on their experiences of cities, towns, and villages. They explained that rural gender 
divisions of labour perpetuated gender ideologies, reinforcing gender inequalities in education 
and early marriage.  
Bwalya (47, father of five, circular rural-urban migrant, fish wholesaler): Girls 
don’t get far ahead in school; they give up quickly. Boys concentrate more 
than girls. But in town girls stay in school. They aspire to be like other women 
who are working. (Translated.)  
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Nsenga (41, circular migrant, fish wholesaler): In the village, there are no 
educated women for girls to look up to, so they don’t aspire for employment. 
(Translated.) 
Annie (45, widow, circular migrant from Mansa (the largest town in Luapula), 
who travels to Chinsanka and Kitwe to trade fish): But here in town, there are 
nurses, teachers, doctors. Girls think, ‘if I am educated then I can be a doctor.’ 
Here in town children see everyone going to school, but in the village they just 
see two people. So what can they be envious of?. (Translated.) 
Nsenga: Here in town a woman may stop school to give birth, then she will be 
desperate to return to school and finish. But in the village they just give birth 
and it’s all over. It’s because of early marriage. There’s nothing else they see 
and aspire to. (Translated.)  
Here Nsenga suggests that it is rare for women to undertake socially valued roles in rural 
areas. Their work is typically devalued. Cooking, cleaning, sweeping, fetching water and 
firewood, as well as weeding and planting (for subsistence agriculture) are commonly referred 
to as ukwikala (just sitting). Expectations of marriage and motherhood seem to shape girls’ 
commitment to education, as well as their parents’ and teachers’ support. These ideologies 
help explain persistent gender gaps in school attendance and literacy in rural areas (CSO 
2011: 57, 2015: 25; Mwansa, 2013).  
Urban experiences are quite different. For instance, on the bustling commute to town, traders 
might pass a woman clad in blue overalls (a powerful symbol of masculine minework), another 
in orange up a pole (repairing electricity cables). Waiting for the bus, they might overhear a 
proud father telling a colleague that his daughter has topped the class. A pick-up truck passes, 
laden with building supplies, driven by a woman, possibly heading to her plot nearby. When 
the bus arrives, they clamber aboard, squeezing in between smartly turned-out schoolgirls 
and businesswomen. Neighbouring female passengers are discussing trade union politics and 
an upcoming meeting in Lusaka. The crackly radio announces an upcoming church service led 
by a female pastor. News items mention the Auditor General and other high-profile female 
compatriots. The bus pulls over at a garage, to be refuelled by a female attendant. All this on 
a routine, unremarkable bus journey. Yet these sightings are powerfully disruptive—
collectively, at least. Cumulative exposure to diverse forms of flexibility in gender divisions of 
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labour seems to enhance women’s confidence that they too can succeed in historically male-
dominated domains—as illustrated in the following life histories: 
Grace, my rural host (circular migrant, fish wholesaler): I was very happy when 
I came to town because I was learning many things that I didn’t know before. 
I saw many women with businesses… They show it’s possible. I won’t suffer… 
In the village they just rely on their husbands, who give them food. The person 
who stays behind in the village and the person who comes to town are different 
in intelligence… Many women have begun to learn because if they get married 
quickly they will be suffering. They’ve awoken now. (Translated.) 
Annie (45, outspoken widow, circular migrant from Mansa): Historically they 
sat on women’s rights [a common figurative expression]… We were scared, 
thinking that if our marriages end then we’ll suffer… My husband refused me 
doing business. I just stayed at home, looking after our children and parents… 
But later I saw educated women providing for their children. I came to think 
that maybe I could do what they are doing… Working women provide for their 
families and their parents without a beloved. So upon his death I drew on his 
pension from being a government driver, I started to look after my children 
and do business… I have freedom to work wherever I want. I can’t go back 
again into marriage because I have the intelligence to think for myself. 
(Translated.) 
Seeing women undertaking the same roles as men and outperforming them (in terms of 
income generation) appears to undermine not only women’s gendered self-perceptions but 
also people’s assumptions about women in general: 
John (43, rural-urban migrant from Chinsanka): Upon coming to town, I saw 
a woman who was safeguarding money, educating her children… Historically 
we used to think a woman would just destroy money and business but actually 
they work very well indeed… Travelling is very important: seeing how our 
friends stay caused me to change my views and my way of living. (Translated.) 
Urban working mothers are commonly portrayed and indeed celebrated as ‘strong’, ‘fighting’ 
(translated) to provide for their children. These masculine accolades reflect the broader sense 
in which gender ideologies about women’s lesser competence and status are being 
undermined through growing exposure to women demonstrating equal competence in 
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masculine domains. This erosion of gender ideologies is distinctly partial, however. Gender 
ideologies still persist: it is primarily stereotypically masculine (rather than feminine) attributes 
that are valorized. Incito sha banakashi (women’s work) tends to be unseen and 
unappreciated. Further, this terminology (physically ‘strong’, ‘fighting’) exemplifies rural 
influences on urban discourses (i.e. rural-urban interconnections), although their meanings 
have modified in this cash-based, mechanized economy marred by financial hardship.  
In towns and cities there seems to be greater likelihood of associating with people who reject 
gender ideologies. Discussion may lead others to question their ideologies—as I observed on 
multiple occasions. For instance, when rural migrants portrayed rural men as doing more 
work, urban women sometimes interrupted, suggesting alternative perspectives, which 
migrants subsequently endorsed. Additionally, many (but not all) rural-urban migrants told 
me that they had heard about gender equality and women’s rights in the urban market. 
Contemporary discourses of gender equality often mention high-profile women in government 
and civil society. Newspaper and radio reports of women being employed in mines, banks, 
and universities provide further disconfirming evidence about gender ideologies. While it is 
problematic that government initiatives on gender are typically limited to awareness-raising 
(Author 2015a), such lip service still appears significant. It is often interpreted as legitimizing 
equality, thereby shifting norm perceptions.  
Importantly, however, associating with people who reject gender inequality is not an inevitable 
consequence of urban residence. Both now and during the colonial period, urban homemakers 
(with multiple children and a heavy burden of care work), home-based traders (often with 
narrow social circles), and domestic workers (labouring alone under a madam) are less 
exposed to egalitarian discourses. With limited exposure to egalitarian discourses circulating 
in public spaces, they may presume that others tolerate gender-based violence and hence 
endure it in silence (Author 2014, 2015b). 
Rural women appear even less likely to be exposed to egalitarian discourses. While Zambian 
media often marginalises women’s voices and contributions (Chimba, 2005; Moma et al, 
2009), it does include some egalitarian programmes, so it is notable that the proportion of 
women who report no weekly media access is almost three times higher in rural areas (45.1% 
versus 16.6%) (CSO et al. 2009: 39). Further, even when people do have radio access (e.g. 
the 69% of rural men who claim to listen at least once a week (CSO et al. 2009: 40)), they 
often dismiss broadcasts about high-profile women as showcasing outliers. Egalitarian 
 
23 
discourses appear most significant in conjunction with first-hand evidence of women’s equal 
competence in socially valued domains (Author 2015a). This is limited in remote rural areas.  
Rural gender ideologies are not endorsed universally. Some villagers came, over the course 
of our interactions, to express vehement resentment of gender inequalities.5 They nonetheless 
conformed due to concerns about norm perceptions or economic dependency (shaped by 
historical legacies of gender bias in education and employment). For example, although Grace 
earned money in town, she gave it all to her husband. Despite being greatly frustrated by this 
practice (getting visibly angry in our discussions, shouting even), she felt powerless to change 
it. Aware that it was uncommon in urban areas, she sighed: ‘those in town, they are lucky, 
they have so much freedom’ (translated). Indeed, the proportion of women reporting that 
their husbands control their earnings is three times lower in urban Zambia: 7.7% versus 
24.3% (CSO 2015: 255).  
Although Grace privately disavowed norm perceptions, she (and others like her) seemed to 
perceive herself as powerless to change the status quo. Similarly, even if male migrants come 
to question the acceptability of gender-based violence or child marriage through urban 
exposure to egalitarian discourses, this is not always sufficient for behavioural change back 
home. Men often seemed reluctant to speak out and intervene in neighbours’ disputes due to 
concerns about social repercussions. Without confidence in changes in norm perceptions, 
individuals often seemed reluctant to rock the boat. Such confidence may be less likely to 
develop in remote areas, as homogeneity constrains exposure to alternatives and thereby 
impedes a positive feedback loop.  
5.2  Proximity to services 
Participants also emphasized spatial variation in access to government services such as clinics 
and police. People in more sparsely populated areas typically live further away from police 
posts (CSO 2011: 249). The nearest police station to Chinsanka is two to three hours’ drive 
away—longer if the deeply potholed dirt road is waterlogged. Rural girls and women are thus 
less likely to be knowledgeable about, familiar with, or financially able to access these services. 
Indeed, rural Zambian women are less likely to report that they have recently obtained help 
from the police (Afrobarometer 2016). Rural men may thus be less likely to fear external 
 
5 I think they became more open with me because we by cultivated rapport over time. However, it is also 
possible that I inadvertently facilitated critical reflection and a shift in their internalized gender ideologies, 
or that they presented themselves as more egalitarian because I unwittingly signalled approval for such. 
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sanction. Spatial variation in access to services (rather than individual circumstances, such as 
wealth or internalized gender ideologies) was reiterated throughout my sample.  
Precious (30, circular migrant): In our village, if he beats her, we just sit. But 
in town they go to the police… Here they are near the police, there at the 
village it’s far. So we can’t manage. You need to find a vehicle. (Translated.) 
Sarah (30, rural homemaker): If we have police then we can overcome the 
problem. They will be afraid. (Translated.) 
BanaBupe (37, married, urban market trader): We urban women, we’re not 
afraid of our husbands. If my husband hits me then I’ll take him to the police. 
We have rights, to go to Victim Support. They’ll write the case down. But village 
people don’t take them to the police… They’re scared… Also, there aren’t many 
police in the village. The government ought to put police posts in the village 
and laws saying that a woman who is beaten should take her husband to the 
police. Then fear in marriage will end. (Translated.)  
While urban women (like BanaBupe) might have exaggerated their assertiveness (to position 
themselves as uniquely modern), and rural women (like Sarah) might have been mistaken 
about the counterfactual consequences of police proximity, both sets of personal accounts 
were consistent with circular migrants’ portrayals of different spaces. Collectively, this data 
indicates that rural women are often privately critical of gender-based violence yet constrained 
by insufficient institutional support. 
Besides providing a deterrent, police posts also appear to influence norm perceptions. Some 
interpreted police intervention as state authorization of women’s bodily autonomy, legitimizing 
their own ideologies. Distance from services may thus explain why people in more sparsely 
populated areas are more likely to support wife beating (see Figures 1 and 4).  
Healthcare is another important service that is often closer to those in densely populated 
areas. Proximity makes it easier to learn about and use family planning services. Chinsanka 
was two hours’ walk from the nearest clinic. Distance may partly explain lower reported use 
of contraceptives, higher unmet need for family planning, and higher rates of teenage 
pregnancy in rural areas. When we control for individual-level variables (age, marital status, 
wealth, employment status, education, etc.), urban women are 1.6 times more likely than 
their rural compatriots to use modern contraceptives (White and Speizer 2007, drawing on 
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data from 2001–2). Further, when rural women’s access to health services increases, so does 
their use of contraceptives. Rural women who were visited by a health worker were 1.83 times 
more likely to report using modern methods (White and Speizer 2007). This indicates that 
rural-urban differences in contraceptive use are largely a consequence of differing service 
access. 
Higher fertility rates in rural areas may reinforce gender inequalities: increasing the likelihood 
of school dropout, increasing the volume of care work, limiting labour market participation, 
reinforcing economic dependency on men, and discouraging marital separation. As Precious 
(30, circular migrant) despaired: ‘we have many children, we won’t manage alone’ 
(translated). 
Obviously, proximity to services only disrupts gender inequalities in conjunction with effective 
and properly funded government policies. It is only in the past decade that the Zambian 
government and cooperating partners have facilitated more gender egalitarian, youth-friendly 
family planning. Prioritization of family planning is emphasized in the Sixth National 
Development Plan 2013–16 as well as the National Health Strategic Plan 2011–15. 
Similarly, only in the past two decades has there been in-service training on gender-based 
violence for the Victim Support Unit as well as the judiciary. The National Plan of Action on 
Gender-Based Violence was established in 2008, followed by the Anti-Gender-Based Violence 
Act (2011) as well as the Gender Equity and Equality Act (2015). As BanaBupe (37, married, 
urban trader) remarked: ‘the government of Kaunda [1964–91] didn’t legislate that we could 
take husbands to court. But this time, you lock him up!’ (translated). These domestic changes 
partly reflect effective transnational feminist organizing, global shifts in norms, and increasing 
financial support. Overseas development assistance for gender equality from OECD-DAC 
members tripled between 2002 and 2012, from USD $8 billion to $24 billion (OECD-DAC 2014). 
6 Discussion 
Consistent with earlier literature, my participants emphasized gendered differences between 
villages, towns, and cities. They attributed more gender egalitarian ideologies and practices 
in the latter to greater exposure to women in socially valued roles and proximity to services.  
While the significance of proximity to services is well established (Chant and McIlwaine 2016; 
Hughes 1997), the point about exposure seems more novel. Seeing a female mechanic may 
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enhance another woman’s confidence in the possibility of herself performing a historically 
male-dominated role, making her more inclined to follow suit. Through multiple sightings of 
such deviation and diversity (mineworkers, electricians, trade unionists, businesswomen, 
preachers, and household heads), others may come to question their ideologies and adopt 
alternative practices—creating a snowballing effect. Multiple sightings are more likely in 
interconnected, heterogeneous, densely populated areas. Seeing a critical mass of women 
performing work previously presumed to be beyond their capabilities appears to undermine 
internalized gender ideologies. It also seems to be perceived as signalling that other people 
regard women as equally competent. This shift in norm perceptions seems to foster a positive 
feedback loop, with rising support for female education, employment, and leadership in urban 
areas. While this may be reinforced by exposure to abstract egalitarian discourses and global 
cultural diffusion, first-hand evidence of women’s equal competence seems particularly 
disruptive (see also Bradshaw 1995 and Chant 2016 on exposure to female household 
headship). 
Continuity in gender ideologies and practices seems more likely in remote rural areas—
although this should not be interpreted as obfuscating diversity, overlap, or interconnections 
within the rural-urban spectrum. Remoteness seems to limit people’s awareness of 
alternatives, reinforce gender ideologies, and dampen confidence in the possibility of social 
change, thereby discouraging contestation and reproducing gender divisions of labour. This 
hypothesis is consistent with a number of studies illustrating the mutually reinforcing 
relationship between rural gender ideologies and divisions of labour (on Bangladesh, 
Botswana, Britain, Honduras, Malawi and Zambia see Bradshaw 1995; Chisamya et al. 2012; 
Giddings and Hovorka 2010; Little 2002; Mwansa 2013). Similarly, with regard to homophobia, 
racism, religion, and xenophobia, Warf (2015: 935) argues that ‘communities lacking cultural 
diversity often suffer a wet blanket of conformity that acts as an echo chamber in which 
alternative views and lifestyles are not imagined.’  
Curiously, diversity and density do not seem to disrupt all gender ideologies and practices. 
Urban Zambian slogans about gender equality rarely include shared care work. In Kitwe, care 
work is more commonly undertaken indoors or inside fenced gardens, out of public sight and 
scrutiny. Thus the few men who do perform care work remain largely invisible. Hence people 
presume it is uncommon. These norm perceptions seem to discourage shared care work 
(Author 2016). This seems to undermine the anonymity hypothesis about the catalytic effects 
of reduced social monitoring in cities. 
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My hypothesis is that gender ideologies in other geographical contexts (both urban and rural) 
will weaken with growing exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. This is borne out 
by earlier research in India (Beaman et al. 2012). Quotas for female leaders in randomly 
allocated villages in West Bengal are associated with a lagged increase in girls’ aspirations and 
educational outcomes, as well as a reduction in their time spent on care work and the gender 
gap in parents’ aspirations for their children (Beaman et al. 2012). Rural social change may 
also occur through exposure to egalitarian alternatives through watching television—as found 
by research in Brazil (La Ferrara et al. 2012). Both studies seem to count against alternative 
hypotheses that rural-urban differences are due to spatial variation in anonymity or economic 
opportunities. My argument is not that urbanization is likely to undermine the power of norm 
perceptions, but rather that it may change their descriptive and normative content. 
This article contributes to the literature on egalitarian social change, at least in the sphere of 
gender relations, in four ways. First, while some (such as Collins 2002) suggest masculinities 
and femininities are primarily about power inequalities (rather than difference), my research 
suggests that gender status beliefs (that men are more worthy of respect and influence) are 
predicated upon assumptions of men and women’s different competencies. These appear to 
weaken with exposure to women performing work previously presumed to be beyond their 
capabilities. This theory could be tested by examining whether there are places in which 
exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour does not undermine gender ideologies. 
Second, this article illustrates how such exposure may come about: through shifts in perceived 
interests, i.e. worsening economic security in the Zambian case. Third, my comparative rural-
urban research indicates that a shift in perceived interests is not sufficient to broaden people’s 
horizons such that they begin to contemplate or have confidence in the possibility of flexibility 
in gender divisions of labour. Fourth, it illustrates the importance of norm perceptions. 
The snowballing process of egalitarian social change seems more likely in diverse, densely 
populated, connected areas where there is increased exposure to (and association with) 
alternative, heterogeneous ideologies and practices. But whereas others have suggested that 
urban heterogeneity merely fosters tolerance of difference (e.g. Dulani et al. 2016; Huggins 
and Debies-Carl 2015; Tonkiss 2003; Warf 2015), my argument is that such exposure may 
erode perceptions of difference (between men and women) and thereby cultivate support for 
equality. It is not that city-dwellers cease to condemn outspoken women; rather, they come 
to champion women leaders.  
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My historical and internationally comparative approach reveals that the urban is not inevitably 
disruptive. Experiences of the urban are shaped by international and government policies, as 
well as by macro-economic conditions. In a context of widespread financial insecurity, urban 
Zambian women’s labour market participation is widely applauded. Because flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour is seen as advantageous, the snowballing process traverses a 
downward slope and gathers pace.6 Here gender may be unique. For other forms of prejudice 
(e.g. between households), deprivation may compound antagonism (see Amin 2002 on racism 
in northern British towns). Equally significant are individual-level circumstances such as age, 
wealth, sexuality, and occupation. Homemakers, home-based traders, and domestic workers 
may be more socially isolated and thus less exposed to urban heterogeneity of ideas and 
practices. The mode of encounter may also be important. Mere proximity may not undermine 
assumptions of difference (Amin 2002; Valentine et al. 2014). But what happens when people 
can demonstrate equal competence? Because they are ‘at work’, ‘fighting’ to provide for their 
families in a context of worsening economic security, the urban women in my case study are 
increasingly seen and evaluated in these terms. The disruptive nature of the urban also varies 
across different domains of gender relations, with remarkably little change occurring in the 
private sphere. The challenge now is to further investigate when, where, and why cities can 
catalyse social change, as well as how these processes might be amplified.  
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